Aiming at the problem of huge losses caused by untimely and inactive emergency rescue information sharing in emergencies， a three-party game model of emergency rescue information sharing involving high-risk enterprises， rescue teams and government regulatory departments was established. Firstly， the payoff matrix and replicated dynamic equations were constructed based on the revenue. Then， stability analysis was performed for four different scenarios respectively. Finally， the evolution processes and results of the system under different scenarios were simulated through computer to obtain the optimal strategies for information sharing. Experimental results show that under the low benefit scenario， if the extra rewards and punishments are high， the willingness of emergency rescue teams to actively share rises to 0.2 and then gradually decreases until they reject information sharing completely； if the extra cost is high， the willingness of high-risk enterprises to actively share rises to about 0.2 and then rapidly decreases to 0. Meanwhile， the behavioral strategies of participants are most sensitive to the changes of positive benefit， then to the changes in extra rewards and punishments and extra costs. The above results can provide guidance for the selection of information sharing strategies in emergency response.